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ABSTRACT
Even though web security protocols are designed to make
computer communication secure, it is widely known that
there is potential for security breakdowns at the human-
machine interface. This paper examines findings from a
qualitative study investigating the identification of secu-
rity decisions used on the web. The study was designed
to uncover how security is perceived in an individual
user’s context. Study participants were tertiary qualified
individuals, with a focus on HCI designers, security pro-
fessionals and the general population. The study identi-
fies that security frameworks for the web are inadequate
from an interaction perspective, with even tertiary qual-
ified users having a poor or partial understanding of se-
curity, of which they themselves are acutely aware. The
result is that individuals feel they must protect them-
selves on the web. The findings contribute a significant
mapping of the ways in which individuals reason and act
to protect themselves on the web. We use these findings
to highlight the need to design for trust at three levels,
and the need to ensure that HCI design does not impact
on the users’ main identified protection mechanism: sep-
aration.
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The human-machine interface is acknowledged as one
of the primary challenges in designing secure human-
computer security systems [24]. The combination of the
human users, (potentially multiple) protocols such as
HTTP and HTTPS, and the various devices that use the
protocols to allow humans to interact, may be described
as a “security ceremony” [10].
Our analysis of security ceremonies known to be bro-
ken [10, 22], has revealed that one source of security
flaws may be attributed to the designers of the systems
and software. From the human perspective, with respect
to web usage, we do not have a good understanding of
how users make security decisions. The purpose of our
study was to examine the security system in its entirety,
from the perspective of interaction design, examining the
users in their context of use. By understanding such de-
cision making processes, our aim is to improve future
designs of interfaces to better protect user security.
OVERVIEW OF STUDY
The central figure in Human-Computer Interaction
(HCI) is “the user” [27]. Gaining an understanding of
how users make security decisions when using the web
is very complex. Whether they are aware of it or not,
when using the web, people make many security related
decisions. However, little research has been conducted
to explore the range of security decisions made and per-
ception of those actions.
Our exploratory study used a qualitative approach to in-
vestigate users’ web usage in their natural environment.
We used week-long diary entries and subsequent in-depth
individual participant interviews with 20 participants ex-
ploring their security decisions made in their web usage.
From this data we distilled common themes about users’
security decisions concerning web usage.
RELATED WORK
Our work is focused mainly on design aspects of secu-
rity of online programs and entities, particularly web
browsers and websites. As such, the prior work which
most closely shares the ideals and approach of our work
is by Dourish et al. [8]. Their research, which focused
more on mobile and wireless ubiquitous computing, simi-
larly used semi-structured interviews to gather data, and
grounded theory to analyse the data. This is appropri-
ate when searching for the right questions to ask rather
than the answers to specific questions. Our work adds
a further piece to the landscape that Dourish et al. be-
gan to describe. While they focused on a set definition
of security and to what degree existing approaches met
that definition, we, using both diary and semi-structured
interview data collection techniques, explored what is
important to users, what their definition of security is,
and what systems individual users put in place to ensure
their security goals are met.
There have been many controlled studies in decision
making regarding security and privacy in the use of sys-
tems, for example, studies into MySpace and Facebook
security and privacy settings [16, 23]. Lampe, Ellison
and Steinfield, in their study of 1085 Facebook users
which explored users’ expectations of privacy, found that
90% of participants believed that no one from outside
their university would read their Facebook page. 97%
of participants believed that no law enforcement agency
would look at their Facebook page [16]. These types of
studies, while useful, examine what has already been im-
plemented in the systems to protect users’ privacy and
security, rather than what the users of the systems be-
lieve should be protected. Qualitative research is re-
quired to gain an understanding of both what the users
wish protected, and the methods of protection which will
be intuitive to them.
Various studies concerning trust on the internet, such as
that done by Lee et al. [17], have been conducted using
surveys. However, while these works provide overview
data, the survey methodology employed tends to gener-
alize across contexts and frame questions from the re-
searchers’ perspective. This means that little insight is
gained into each individual’s priorities, decision making
processes and practices. This was also the conclusion of
Connelly et al., when they stated that surveys were not
able to reflect participants’ privacy concerns accurately,
and that the discrepancy depended on the context [5].
Several studies have been conducted into the effective-
ness of web-based security warnings [2, 28, 30]. In
their study, Sotirakopoulos et al.’s primary finding was
that laboratory experiments concerning security deci-
sions were fundamentally flawed. They observed that
the most common reason the participants gave for ig-
noring security warnings was that they trusted the study
in which they were participating. Secondly, they stated
that the security conscious were reluctant to take part
in such studies, so we have ensured we have included
members from the computer security community [30].
Sotirakopoulos et al. and Connelly et al. raise questions
about the ability to draw security practices and user be-
haviour conclusions for the general population from such
non-contextual studies. This has led us to take a differ-
ent approach centred on people and their own contexts
of use.
We examine a more fundamental question of, “What is
it that the users are trying to protect?” rather than first
presuming what needs to be protected and secondly at-
tempting to create more useful warnings to protect those
presumed areas.
There is a body of work which focuses on achieving se-
curity by aligning what a system does with the user’s
mental models of that system [4, 29, 35]. The concept
of aligning the actual system to the user’s mental model
of the system (or vice versa) is useful at a guiding level
along the lines of “the user must understand what the
system is doing, and what the response to their actions
will be.” However, the concept of the human cogni-
tive model that exists prior to the situation is a con-
tentious one. There is significant evidence that people
co-construct meaning using embodied competencies and
situational circumstances [31].
Trust
Literature from the past 15 years is replete with papers
concerning trust on the web. The reality of a world wide
web necessitates investigating trust issues in a number of
categories. Areas of trust include what makes users trust
a website, the role of trust in customer loyalty, and how
to address trust across cultural boundaries [6, 9, 14].
Attempts to establish trust with people the first time
they visit a website are usually aimed at a range of trig-
gers upon which users have been “trained” to base their
decision to proceed. These triggers include the list of
measures taken to ensure data is transferred, processed
and stored securely, and displaying seals of independent
trusted third party auditors [9].
Notably, there appears no consensus regarding whether
ease-of-use is a factor which strongly relates to the user
trusting a website. Some studies have shown there is
little correlation [12, 25] while other studies have shown
a strong relationship [26]. In addition, usability has been
shown to be a security issue, with poor usability directly
impacting the security of a system [33].
Spelling and grammar have been found to be a factor in
establishing a user’s trust in a website. Poor spelling,
grammar and syntax create doubts about the party’s
identity and thus impede what is termed calculative and
knowledge based trust [15].
Koehn divides trust into four categories:
1. Goal-based trust: the trust that arises when two par-
ties have a similar objective.
2. Calculative trust: trust that is created based on ev-
idence. Is there a good reputation and a history of
keeping promises?
3. Knowledge-based trust: trust based on knowledge of
the other party, their character, and having worked
with them previously. This is not distinct from calcu-
lative trust.
4. Respect-based trust: the parties respect each other,
do not wish to exploit each other, and are open to
constructive criticism [15].
Most efforts to establish trust between vendors and buy-
ers online, such as security certificates, are targeted
at calculative and knowledge-based trust. Respect-
based trust is more lasting than either calculative or
knowledge-based trust [15]. Finally, trust is significant
with regard to customer loyalty. Specifically in the con-
text of e-commerce, significant supportive evidence sug-
gests that customers who feel a higher level of trust in
the store will revisit the site more often [17].
Privacy
Privacy is generally approached as a social consideration,
whereas security is seen as a technical concern, though
they are closely related [7]. We argue that technical se-
curity decisions have such an impact on privacy, that
privacy needs to be considered from a technical perspec-
tive, in order to ensure that the privacy expected from
the social perspective is protected.
HTTPS and Extended Validation Certificates
Most users have visited websites with addresses starting
with “HTTPS”. Addresses starting with HTTPS should
mean that a secure connection has occurred between the
user’s web browser and the viewed web site, accomplish-
ing the security goals of confidentiality and integrity.
There is nothing in HTTPS which guarantees the iden-
tity of the other party. All that the user can be assured
of is that they are securely connected to someone, and
unfortunately that someone may not be the entity the
user believes they are connected to [10]. To help combat
this, Extended Validation Certificates have been intro-
duced.
The process of acquiring an extended validation certifi-
cate enforces that the holder of a certificate, required for
HTTPS communication, is who they claim to be [11].
This allows web browsers to display the name of the
company who owns the website, as well as the company’s
web address. Recent enhancements include colour cod-
ing of the address bars in web browsers which is now
standard, and more effective visual warning techniques
regarding security certificates as described in Maurer et
al.’s research [21].
METHODOLOGY
Although there were two trials at two different times, the
participants in each trial were identical, except for two
participants who left Australia before the second study
started. The first study we call Web Logs and the second
study we call In-depth Contextual Interviews.
Participants
Twenty participants (18 for the second study) were re-
cruited in Australia via two research groups (human-
computer interaction (HCI) design and information se-
curity) and from personal contacts of the researchers.
Seven participants were from the general community
(aged between 25-64), six were HCI design researchers
who build prototypes and systems for humans to use
(aged between 25-54), and seven participants were com-
puter security researchers (aged between 25-74). 45%
were female and 55% were male, with all having tertiary
qualifications. Nine participants were recently from a
country other than Australia (within the last two years),
while 11 participants have been in Australia for more
than l0 years. There were eight nationalities, from four
continents, represented. All participants owned their
own computer (at least one).
Procedure
Participation involved a week long diary study of web-
based security decisions, typically accompanied by pic-
tures of their screen at the time of decision, followed by
in-depth qualitative interviews.
Web Logs / Diaries
Participants were asked to keep a one week log of their se-
curity decisions made while using the web on their com-
puter. A template for the log file was provided to each
participant. The template, a Microsoft Word document,
consisted of a table with three columns. The columns
were titled:
Screen image (of the web page)
Thoughts about the security decision
Your security decision
An example weblog entry from one of the participants is
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Example weblog (fonts adjusted for readabil-
ity).
Weblogs were encouraged wherever the participant used
the Internet, be that home or work, with some partici-
pants having a weblog for home and for work. Partici-
pants’ weblogs ranged in size from one participant having
one entry through to two participants having more than
15 entries. Typically weblogs had four to seven entries.
In-depth Contextual Interviews
Participants’ perceptions of computer security, their de-
cision making processes and their subsequent actions
were elicited via semi-structured in-depth interviews.
The interview process was conducted in the tradition
of Beyer and Holtzblatt who recommend a Master-
Apprentice technique, where the interviewer is the ap-
prentice learning from the participant who is the master
[1].
These 30-70 minute interviews covered four broad topics,
including: a) participant’s experience using computers,
b) the meaning of computer security, c) the range of ac-
tivities and settings used on the internet and d) respon-
sibility for computer security. In this way, the interviews
explored the participant’s background to better under-
stand their experiences and reasons for their methods
and actions, without resorting to subjective “assess your
computing knowledge on a numerical scale” techniques.
Throughout the study, in all communications the term
security was used, with no further delineation provided.
As Yee states, “It is impossible to even define what se-
curity means without addressing user expectations [34].”
To this end, in their interview, conducted after comple-
tion and submission of their weblog, each participant
was asked to complete the sentence “Computer security
means to me...”
This approach of blending interviews and weblogs was
chosen as a useful way to achieve an understanding of
decisions made in the context of use. Diary studies have
the shortcomings of any self-reporting mechanism, but
the diary studies provide significant insight into a partici-
pant’s decision making process in their own environment,
and the self-reporting issues were partially mitigated via
the subsequent in-depth interviews. This methodology
provided us with rich information about how each indi-
vidual uses the web in their normal environments.
Analytic Method
The data collected from the weblogs and interviews was
compared and analysed, with a thematic analysis con-
ducted to identify themes and patterns [13, 19, 18].
Through reading and rereading the data, weblog entries
and interviews were investigated and classified. Coding
was done with common and contrasting concepts iden-
tified. Finally, themes were identified to create a com-
prehensive picture of how and what users protect on the
web.
FINDINGS
There were two broad themes presented in our data.
Firstly, a problem was identified, which was that there
is a lack of delineation between what should be trusted
and what could not be trusted. This problem has led
to our participants individually realizing that their secu-
rity and privacy are insufficiently protected. Secondly,
we outline what behaviours and processes the partici-
pants have exhibited, on an individual basis, to protect
themselves and mitigate against the risks created by this
absence of rules. This leads to our discussion regarding
the impact of our findings to HCI design.
Identified Problem: Users Need to Protect Themselves on
the Internet
Particularly the participants from the general population
and the participants who design human-computer inter-
faces identified that there was a lack of delineation in the
web interface regarding what could be trusted and what
could not be trusted. This led to an unknown status
regarding their privacy and security. Secondly, a contin-
uum of concerns, for which the users need to have secu-
rity and privacy provided, was identified. Thirdly, the
participants responses provided a clear message that the
responsibility for security is being forced on the users.
Lack of Delineation Leading to Obscured Security
Several users, in both their weblogs and interviews, cited
aspects of a web page as reasons to trust a website.
These aspects included the VeriSign logo, privacy poli-
cies, FAQs, and terms and conditions. In line with
Eggar’s guidance on how to make users of e-commerce
websites feel more comfortable, participants reported
feeling more confident if a local physical address is listed,
and a local telephone number [9].
However, a contrasting view was reported from other
participants. They wondered how hard it would be for
the designer of a malicious web page to include these
items, and whether they should be basing her decision on
them. In direct contrast to Eggar’s guidance on how to
make users feel more comfortable, a participant from the
general population stated in his web log that he looked
for HTTPS and the padlock symbol, in the interview he
made a point of saying that he did not trust graphics
such as the VeriSign logo posted on the web page, or
statements made on the website about encryption.
The concerned users asked two essential questions:
“Who decides?” and “How do I know that it hasn’t
been faked?” The question of “Who decides” is central
to users having trust in their web experience, including
both the web browser and the web page. There is no
overarching rationale or conceptual explanation of why
programs are the way they are. Who decides if a padlock
is shown? Who decides if the company name is shown in
the address bar and elsewhere on the page? This is a step
away from providing clearer or more obvious security in-
dicators or warnings (such as in [21]). As a step before
enhancing security indicators or warnings, the user needs
to clearly understand the question of “Who decides” if
the security indicator or warning is shown.
To counteract a lack of assurance that the user is con-
nected to the correct website, Extended Validation Cer-
tificates were introduced in 2007, which has led to colour
coding of address bars in modern browsers. However, not
one participant in their week of logging their web-based
security decisions, referred to making use of any of the
additional information Extended Validation Certificates
afforded them. This is in keeping with Lin et al.’s find-
ing regarding domain highlighting, where they found in
their study that domain highlighting also had little ben-
efit [20]. Domain highlighting is another enhancement,
similar to colour coding based on Extended Validation
Certificates, also aimed at preventing users from visiting
incorrect websites.
In this section we highlight that the delineation between
what is easy for a malicious agent to manipulate, and
what is hard for a malicious agent to manipulate, is cur-
rently unclear in the eyes of our studies’ participants.
Once this distinction has been clarified for the users,
further work is required to make transparent to the user
the process of who decides when the security indicators
are shown. Finally, the meaning of the indicators needs
to be understood by the users.
Web Concerns Continuum
Participants with little computer security education had
different concerns from those of the security special-
ists. Although practices are individualized for all par-
ticipants, there are some notable differences between the
concerns of security professionals and general partici-
pants. For those with little computer security education,
most of their concerns revolved around the entity they
were communicating with over the web. For those with
significant computer security education, almost all con-
cerns were with their own computer and with the com-
munication channel connecting their computer to the en-
tity they were interacting with over the web. We charac-
terize the range of concerns from computer to connection
to entity to recipients as a web concerns continuum, not-
ing that people with and without security education are
largely concerned with different aspects of this contin-
uum.
The concerns the participants from the general popula-
tion had regarding the entity they were interacting with.
These concerns included employees of the entity, com-
bined entities, mistakenly sending information to the
wrong entity, and non-entities. Multiple businesses of
the same type placing information online, such that cus-
tomers could log in from anywhere and access their de-
tails, made participants feel as if that one location was
going to be an attractive target to hackers. Other con-
cerns were regarding sending private information to the
wrong person, or transfering money to the wrong ac-
count. Caitlin, who works from home, was most con-
cerned that the entity may no longer exist:
I must admit sometimes I buy stuff and I think,
“What if this website is a year old and nobody is
actually at the other end and people are just collect-
ing my credit card details and nothing is actually
going to happen?”
And even getting an email back doesn’t mean any-
thing because so many of them are automated!
In contrast, participants from the security community
were far more concerned about their immediate interface
device and the communication channel from their device
to the entity they were communicating with. Not one se-
curity participant referred to the entity at the other end,
in the way that the general population was concerned
about issues such as the already discussed non-entities,
or who was employed by the company. With respect to
the device, the concerns ranged from the type of oper-
ating system, to the browser, to who was the main user
of the computer, and even if the operating system was
stored on re-writable memory.
In this section we have shown a range of issues on the
web concerns continuum that includes the user’s com-
puter, the channel to the website with which they are
communicating, the website, the business whose website
is being viewed, and the employees of the business. No
participant thought of the entire continuum, but allay-
ing fears for the entire continuum is required to satisfy
all users.
Users are Responsible for Computer Security
Particularly notable is that all participants except one,
when asked who was responsible for their computer’s se-
curity, answered at least partially “Me”. The exception
was a design researcher with a Masters degree, Chloe,
who believes that the responsibility rests entirely with
the software on her computer. For most participants,
the response of “Me” was an absolute, especially for their
home computer. This may be a result of a culture that
has developed from many years of End User Licenses
for software removing all responsibility from the soft-
ware developers, and placing all responsibility on the
user. No participants were employed as system admin-
istrators. Effectively, this means that untrained people
are drawing on their personal experience and are indi-
vidually making the best use of the limited set of tools
available to them, to protect their computers and online
activities.
Users’ Actions and Motivation
Having identified that there is a problem, that the partic-
ipants feel the need to protect themselves, the responses
of the participants revealed how they were protecting
themselves and what they were protecting.
Individual Mitigation of the Absence of Rules
The most consistent theme observed through the anal-
ysis of the web logs and interviews was the diversity of
security techniques employed while using the web. All
participants used their computer daily, all were univer-
sity educated, and a third of the participants were secu-
rity researchers. Therefore, some level of consistency in
line with a collective best practice may be expected. In-
stead, there was little or no consistency, especially when
each participant’s technique was explored in detail in the
interview. Each participant was found to be protecting
themselves to the level of their knowledge. This is in-
dicative of a system without defined and enforced rules.
We separate the responses into three groups: the general
group who will use the system, the HCI researchers who
design the systems, and the security researchers who may
be considered experts to give insight into the extremes
of the measures taken. In keeping with Yee’s observa-
tion that, “It is impossible to even define what security
means without addressing user expectations,” [34] we
will include the participant’s definitions of what security
means to them.
General population: Rebecca has different definitions
for security if she is at home or at work. She completes
her financial transactions at work since she believes the
computer system and network at work is a more secure
system than at home. In contrast, Georgia, a govern-
ment worker with a Bachelor degree, whose definition of
security asks whether she is broadcasting her information
to other people, specifically will not complete any finan-
cial transactions at work. She states that this is because
at work she has no control over the network, software,
or how often protective programs are run. Georgia uses
a low limit credit card, PayPal, and EBay, since she is
confident that if she challenges a purchase attributed to
her via these means, they will refund her money. Brian,
whose definition of security is to feel confident and un-
inhibited to do the task he needs to do, searches, shops
and makes bookings online but sends credit card details
via fax.
HCI researchers: Bianca, PhD, defines computer se-
curity as only she can access her computer and no one
else can. Bianca posts her credit card details using tra-
ditional mail to smaller organizations, rather than send
the details over the internet. If she must send her credit
card details over the internet, then she does so via email
and splits the credit card number into two emails. Chloe,
whose definition of computer security is protecting her
data from being accessed by other people, never pur-
chases online. She researches her purchases online, but
then travels to physical stores to make her purchases.
Sarah separates her definition of computer security into
protecting the computer from attacks that come over
the network, physical protection such as not leaving the
computer in a location where it may be easily stolen,
and backing up her data. Sarah completes almost all
of her shopping, including groceries, online. She has a
low credit limit credit card solely for online purchases,
and separate bank logins. With one bank login, she can
access all of her accounts, but cannot transfer to any ac-
count that is not her own. With the other bank login,
she can only access one account which normally has a
very low balance, and with this login she can transfer
money online to other people’s bank accounts. When
Sarah needs to transfer to another person’s account, she
logs into her bank with the first login. She then trans-
fers from her main account to the account that can be
accessed with the second login and logs out. Sarah then
logs back in with the second login, and transfers the pur-
posefully placed money to the other person’s account.
Security researchers: Samuel, who has a Masters de-
gree, has a security definition which he separates into
three parts. Those parts are: physical security similar
to Sarah’s definition; network security which is the trans-
mission of information point to point; and information
security where the main goal is to hide the information.
Samuel specifically asked for, and acquired, an electronic
device from his bank which provides him with a new
electronic token every minute. Each time he wishes to
log in to the bank, he uses his login and password, and
the extra electronic token. Once logged in, he uses the
changing token for any transfers out of the bank also.
Dylan has a definition of security which he separates into
the computer’s security and the communication security.
The computer’s security refers to the machine, operat-
ing system, and software. The communication security
refers to working safely on the internet. Security is look-
ing after assets in a broad sense - whatever is important
to you. Dylan consciously chooses to use the Linux op-
erating system when browsing the web, since there are
fewer attacks designed for the Linux operating system
than for more mainstream operating systems. In partic-
ular, Dylan will not make purchases or conduct online
banking on his children’s computers.
Nicholas, PhD, defines computer security as being there
to secure personal information, and personal transac-
tions. Nicholas has an operating system on CD, which he
boots from when he wishes to use the internet for bank-
ing, and then uses only the web browser. He does this
because booting from a non-re-writeable CD minimizes
his exposure to social engineering attacks via email, and
exposure to malicious software is restricted to the time
the computer is powered. As soon as the computer is re-
booted, the system would need to be compromised again.
In this section we have provided examples of how users
are individually addressing the problem of needing to
protect themselves on the internet. Critically, everyone
was protecting themselves to the best of their knowledge
and expertise. There was not a delineation of “those who
care about security” and “those who don’t”; rather, ev-
eryone cared and already employed the best scheme they
knew. A theme common to the techniques employed is
the theme of separation, for example using a separate
credit card or bank account, sending information via an-
other communication channel such as facsimile or email,
or even using a separate computer or operating system.
While educating users about the security and privacy
settings of the latest online applications and devices may
be unrealistic, general lessons such as being aware of and
maintaining separations may have some merit, and HCI
designs should enhance rather than undermine these sep-
arations for the sake of security and privacy behaviours.
What Users Wish to Protect
Having identified how the users are protecting, we now
outline what participants stated was important enough
for them to want the information protected, which was
found to depend on the participant’s circumstances.
Protected information included:
• financial details and accounts used to access money,
• personal information such as physical address and tele-
phone number for themselves,
• details concerning children such as photos, names and
schools, - medical details, and
• information that could directly lead to identity theft
such as a scanned image of their passport.
Participants typically had three levels of safe guarding,
though some had only two. Always in the top level was
financial information. Nicholas said the reason for this
was because it was “real money.”
Money: Placing money-related web interaction in the
category that requires the greatest protection was consis-
tent across study participants. This categorization oc-
curs even though some participants consciously noted
that they had never heard of an online attack on a bank.
Participants described that they was more aware of phys-
ical devices being added to Automatic Teller Machines,
which would acquire their card details and Personal Iden-
tification Number, than any losses made due to Inter-
net banking. Even without concrete awareness, all users
placed online finances in the most protected category.
Medical conditions: None of the participants in the
age groups younger than 45-54 mentioned concerns re-
garding searches for medical conditions. Almost all par-
ticipants in the 45+ age groups raised concerns about
searches for medical conditions being traceable back to
them. These participants highlighted that if they vis-
ited a physical library and read a book inside the li-
brary, no one would have a record of that occurrence.
However, searching for the information on the internet
created a permanent record which could be linked back
specifically to the participant’s machine. A participant
drew an analogy to HIV 30 years ago, when there was
a stigma associated with the disease, and that there are
ailments with similar stigmas now. As an example, she
considered the case of a person using the Amazon web-
site to purchase a book on a topic with a similar stigma,
and worried that the website with its knowledge of past
transactions would prompt the user “You may be also
interested in....” She stated, “The prompt insensitively
indicates that they, an online bookseller, know all about
the medical conditions you are interested in.” Patrick
notes that records of the interaction would exist at po-
tentially multiple locations such as the participant’s In-
ternet Service Provider (ISP), the search website they
used, and the subsequently visited website.
Personal Levels of Security
Some participants control their levels of security by pass-
word use. If a website as critically important, then the
website gets its own password. Less important sites get
shared passwords. One participant’s method of catego-
rizing the websites is based on finances. Her lowest level
of shared password is used for websites, such as EBay
and Amazon, where obtaining her password allows an
attacker to make purchases or bids on her behalf, but
not pay for them. She hopes and believes that the peo-
ple involved at EBay and Amazon would understand if
an attack occurred. While participants wished for the
ability to group their passwords, they noted that there
is no consistent rule for what is a secure password. On
some sites, the rule for what constitutes an acceptable
password may be letters and numbers only, while others
may require letters, numbers and special characters.
Most participants had three levels of concern, with one
participant having a separate physical device for each of
the levels. As mentioned, for banking and anything with
“real money”, he boots a laptop using an operating sys-
tem on non-re-writable CD. At the next level down, for
personal items that could lead to identity theft, he has
an encrypted USB stick. This encrypting both restricts
access under what he describes as normal “browsing the
desktop” circumstances, and also protects in the case of
loss of the USB stick. At the lowest level are the websites
he is not concerned about, such as news, Wikipedia, and
the universal library.
In contrast, some participants had only two levels. Chloe
states that as long as the website is related to money,
then she looks for security indicators. If the website is
not related to money, then it is “just for fun” and she is
not worried about privacy issues. Specifically, she does
not mind sharing her name and address. Chloe’s view,
that the most important protection aspect for her was
protection from her data being lost, was unique for the
participant group. She stated that she prefers to share
the data than to lose it. Also in contrast to the three-
levels of security that most participants had was that
for some participants, the levels are fluid. They decide
whether to enter personal information on the context,
and whether they believe the organization needs that
information.
In this section we have provided the range of information
that users identified as being worthy of special protec-
tion. We have shown that most users sort their infor-
mation into three tiers of security importance, though
some users have only two tiers. Common amongst all
participants was the need for financial security, and then,
depending on the participant’s situation, items such as
information about their children or medical information
became critical for them to protect also.
DISCUSSION AND IMPACT TO WEB-BASED HCI DESIGN
We have shown that the delineation between what is easy
for a malicious agent to manipulate, and what is hard for
a malicious agent to manipulate, is currently insufficient
in the eyes of our studies’ participants. This has led to
an unknown status of security and privacy, where the
participants, none of whom are trained system admin-
istrators, are responsible for the security and privacy of
their systems. Each participant was therefore protecting
themselves to the best of their ability, based on their ex-
periences, with the limited set of tools available to them.
Already, this study has highlighted some major issues,
such as the need for an overarching set of guidelines
for browsers, which allows users to understand which
parts of what is displayed to them are browser-controlled
and which parts are website-controlled. Secondly, in-
creased responsibility for security and privacy is required
with the software production companies - all end user li-
cense agreements (EULAs) examined for major browsers
and operating systems had disclaimers such as “AS IS”
and “WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND.” There
have been notable shortfalls in the trustworthiness of
programs, even amongst the world’s biggest software
companies. These include compiled-in “back door” ac-
counts that allow access to all implementations regard-
less of access and password settings, and backup facilities
that corrupted files as they were copied [3, 32].
Our research has described a web-security continuum,
which the participants have described as being the range
of areas that they are concerned about regarding security
and privacy. This continuum includes the user’s com-
puter, the channel to the website with which they are
communicating, the website, the business whose website
is being viewed, and the employees of the business. This
means there is a need to design for trust at the com-
puter, communications, website and business levels, and
the whole continuum holistically, for web usage to be un-
hindered by security and privacy concerns. An overview
of the findings from our two human studies are presented
in Figure 2.
We have described how, in the absence of an effective
security and privacy solution, our participants have in-
dividually constructed and implemented schemes to en-
hance their security and privacy protection. Central to
many of the disparate measures was the concept of sep-
aration, ensuring that, as much as possible, a malicious
entity could not acquire what the participant would like
to protect by compromising one location. This is an
essential message to the designers of web applications
and signup processes, who may be designing systems
which undermine their users’ main protection mecha-
nism, which is keeping information separate. An exam-
ple of undermining of users’ protection schemes is de-
scribed in the experience Dylan shared regarding Pay-
Pal:
I had an issue with PayPal in the last few weeks,
where they restricted my account. I hadn’t used it
for several months and then I tried to use it and they
said your account was restricted and then I had to go
through all these kinds of security checks including
giving them my credit card number again which of
course one of the reasons to use paypal is to avoid
using the credit card. . . . My reaction to that was
that I didn’t go ahead with that at that time. I went
off and I did some googling and I found out vari-
ous people talking about this and it turned out that
several other people had also been suspicious about
this kind of activity. . . . I eventually got some confi-
Figure 2. Findings overview.
dence that this was a normal PayPal procedure and
eventually decided to go ahead.
Our participants have provided insight into what types
of information they wish to protect, and shown that
they typically need three levels of security depending
on the activity and the context. Also applicable may
be the realization that for Internet interaction which re-
quires the highest level of security, for example internet
banking, some participants are employing self-protection
techniques resistant to change such as using operating
systems on non-re-writable media. Such websites that
are subsequently adjusted to use the latest technology
for aesthetic reasons may render these CDs and their
browsers obsolete, which undermines the user’s protec-
tion mechanism.
LIMITATIONS
While the studies were quite useful to us there are some
notable limitations of this study. Concerning the demo-
graphics, all participants were tertiary qualified and the
data was collected in one country, Australia. There were
no extremely novice users - the least amount of computer
use was seven years. There were no significantly infre-
quent users, e.g. less than once a week, and there were
no children amongst the participants.
Our participants, who are all tertiary educated, may
present the best case scenario for how people go about
protecting their own data. While the themes of every-
one protecting themselves to the best of their ability,
and using various forms of separation to provide protec-
tion, seem likely to remain constant, questions regarding
what the users view as worth or needing protection, seem
likely to change.
Concerning the technique of users keeping a weblog, the
technique has the inbuilt issues that any self-reporting
mechanism has, including changing behaviour due to
the keeping of the diary, self-censoring, and no absolute
guarantee of truthfulness (though all participants were
quite trustworthy). This limitation was at least partially
mitigated by the subsequent interviews, in which partic-
ipants were queried about their web usage.
CONCLUSION
The study of tertiary qualified individuals has shown
that users have identified that the current framework,
that allows them to interact with the internet securely,
is insufficient. As a guide to future HCI work, the ques-
tion of “Who decides?” needs to be repeatedly asked.
Before new and hopefully better security warnings and
indicators are developed, first ask if the user will be able
to discern “Who decides?” whether the warning or indi-
cator is shown.
In the absence of credible solutions, users are creating
their own techniques aimed at enhancing their security,
to provide them with the confidence to interact online.
A significant contribution of the study is the mapping
out of the ways in which people rationalize and develop
their own individual approaches and techniques to pro-
tect their own security. As such, we have added a fur-
ther piece to the landscape that Dourish et al. began
to describe [8]. HCI design has a major role in the es-
tablishment of a consistent framework which users are
comfortable enough with, so that they feel less need to
create their own ad hoc solutions.
The literature is replete with research concerning the
role of trust on the internet, usually the role of trust in
determining if the user will interact the first time, and
subsequently. Our research supports this. Further, our
participants have identified questions of trust concerning
the protocol and software. This is despite critical soft-
ware, such as the operating system and web browser,
having license agreements which state the software is
provided on an “as is” basis. This basis for the creation
of software clearly does not meet the users’ requirements
for trust.
We have shown the web concerns continuum and the lev-
els of safe-guarding users have for the data they identify
as worthy of protection, which the HCI designers need
to address and facilitate. Further work is also required
in the user-identified lack of delineation between parts
of the web interface which they could presume were dif-
ficult for a malicious party to manipulate, and the parts
a malicious party could manipulate easily.
Finally, we provided a list of HCI design issues identified
by the participants in our study. Since users need to
protect themselves, HCI designers need to be aware of
the methods they are using to protect themselves. Any
technique employed by a HCI designer that undermines
a user’s self-protection mechanism is counterproductive.
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